|
按标签浏览
所有标签 » 言论 ( RSS)
对不起,当前没有更多可用于过滤的标签了。
-
|
谢国忠:核子寒冬? (点击获取译文) 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ We are witnessing, day by day, a hard landing of the global economy
before our eyes. The chaotic failure of Lehman Brothers triggered the
panic that is forcing deleveraging in markets on a gigantic scale. The
Treasury and the Fed have failed miserably in their handling of the
crisis. Unless they come out with effective and decisive measures soon,
the United States could end up like Indonesia a decade ago: financial
chaos leads to economic chaos that leads to socio-political chaos-a
self-sustaining vicious cycle that would impoverish the country. The
article below was written one week ago and just came out in the current
issue of Caijing Magazine. It makes the case that, regardless of
effective financial bailouts, an economic crisis is inevitable. The
Anglo-Saxon economies would contract like East Asian economies in 1998
by 2-5% in 2009, and would stay weak for years afterwards like
Southeast Asia after 1998. Emerging economies have to
figure out how to grow on their own, or they would stay weak alongside.
The key is to start a South-South trade and investment boom. Oil-rich
countries should invest in China and India, buy consumer and capital
goods from them, and sell resources to them. This is probably the only
case for the next bull market. Cheers. Andy Nuclear winter? Even
though the global financial crisis is far from over, a global economic
crisis seems to be unfolding already. The recent economic data suggest
that the global economy is decelerating rapidly, probably contracting
sequentially already. Even though the US Congress reluctantly passed
the $700 bn rescue plan for the Wall Street, stock markets are not
celebrating that and are already focusing on the economic downside.
Many investors are bearish enough to talk about a 'nuclear winter' for
the global economy. How bad could it be? Ten years ago,
the Asian Financial Crisis began in the spring of 1997, a severe
economic crisis followed in 1998. Asian stock markets contracted by
half to two thirds from peak to bottom between 1997-98 and many
currencies were devalued by one third to half. In US dollar terms,
Asian asset prices plunged by 70-90%. Following the severe wealth
destruction, most economies contracted by 5-10% in 1998. Could the
global economy follow the same pattern this time? The
Anglo-Saxon economies would follow a similar pattern to what East Asian
economies experienced one decade ago. Australia, the UK, and The US
could...
|
-
|
Rate cuts are not enough /谢国忠 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ Major central banks
coordinated rate cuts for maximum psychological impact. I am afraid
that the impact would indeed be psychological. Markets may stage a
significant bounce soon. If this round of rate cuts isn't enough for a
bounce, the central banks will come back with more, because they are
targeting stock prices. In the short term, they will win. But,
central banks cannot cure the problem. A hard landing of the global
economy is unfolding before our very eyes. The reason is, of course,
credit contraction. The credit system doesn't function because there
isn't enough equity capital in all components of the western economy.
Households, at least Anglo-Saxon bit, have borrowed against inflated
house values. Now, property prices are falling. They have to de-lever
to stave off bankruptcies, let alone borrowing more to sustain
consumption. Western financial institutions have
warehoused credit derivatives backed by inflated house values. The
bursting of the property bubble has destroyed their capital base.
Western governments are injecting capital into them through share
expansion or buying toxic assets at inflated prices. This process is
under way. But, unless households have restored their equity capital,
by increasing savings sufficient enough to offset house value decline,
they cannot borrow from banks. Even if they want to, banks cannot lend
to them for lack of collaterals. The western business
sector is least levered. But, they won't borrow and invest when the
consumer sector is comatose. Besides, a significant part of the
business sector is highly levered. Private equity funds have spent
trillions of dollars on leveraged buyouts ('LBOs'). These highly
leveraged businesses are vulnerable to an economic downturn. A major
crisis in the LBO sector is coming soon, I think. It will cut capex
spending considerably. Western countries are all now
relying on government borrowing to recapitalize their financial system.
The equity capital that they create is genuine, I think. It is just
shifting debt from one part of the economy to another. In the end, how
could their governments pay off their debts? I think
that the west is moving towards an Inflationary Solution. As debts
shift to governments and central banks keep pumping money, inflation
will happen. It will inflate away their debts. That is essentially
robbing the countries that have earned trade surpluses over the past...
|
-
|
Rate cuts are coming/ 谢国忠 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ The collapse of the US bailout
bill in the Congress indicates enormous resistance to solve the
financial mess with taxpayers' money. The bill, I think, will be
resuscitated in some form soon. But, it won't change the political
reality that the US taxpayers resist paying for the Wall Street's mess. The
bailout plan won't rescue the economy. The US government hopes that the
bailout will allow banks to lend again. But, to whom? The US households
borrowed in the past with appreciating home value as collateral. The
consumer credit is already slowing sharply (2.1% in July vs. 5.6% in
2007). The consumer credit risk is too high when unemployment is rising
so fast. The financial sector doesn't want to lend to households even
when they have money. As consumption contracts, businesses won't raise
capex. The chances are that they will decrease it. As the global
economy is weak, exports won't help like before. Whatever angle we look
at this, it seems the US economy is heading for unprecedented
contraction. The pressure on central banks to ease
extends to other economies. Government debt levels are too high in
Europe and Japan, and tax rates are already too high. As their
economies contract, their politicians will pressure their central banks
to ease. At the same time, energy price will remain
high, and labor productivity sluggish. The bout of rapid labor
productivity growth due to global trade boom is winding down. Hence,
sluggish global economy won't decrease inflationary pressure like
before. China is also under enormous pressure to cut
rates, even though inflationary pressure remains high. The fiscal
policy is too slow to dent the rapid deceleration of the economy. I
think that lending rates can be cut by 1.5 percentage points over the
next twelve months, but the deposit rates will remain quite stable. The
lending margin for banks can contract to below 2%. This kind of policy
is all reasonable in Chinese context. Banks made a lot of money during
the boom. They should share the burden on the way down. Hence,
global coordinated cuts of interest rates may happen soon. Printing
money may become the most important source of funds for recapitalizing
the financial system. Stagflation is here to stay. I remain bullish on energy and gold, bearish on pretty much anything else. 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/
|
-
|
B计划难救美国 谢国忠/文 总第221期 出版日期:2008-09-29 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ 7000亿美元援救计划只能短期提振市场信心;排斥来自非西方国家的投资,是美国解决当前问题的主要障碍 美国政府紧急推出一套援救金融体系的措施。这些措施被称做B计划,其内容包括:(1)成立一个政府机构,接管金融机构7000亿美元的不良资产——这
个数字还不包括援救AIG、房地美和房利美(下称“两房”)支出的近3000亿美元;(2)给金额高达3.4万亿美元的货币市场基金提供担保;(3)暂时
禁止对近800只金融股的卖空。 这些措施挽救了市场,但是,幸福的感觉不会持续太久。B计划不会扭转美国经济颓势。2009年,美国经济增长将下滑大约2个百分点。长期而言,美国仍
需理清如何支付危机导致的损失,减小实体经济与金融业的杠杆率,并找到非债务刺激经济增长模式。这次不仅是投资者的信心危机,而且美国经济的基本面出了问
题。 华尔街空前考验 雷曼兄弟申请破产保护引发金融市场剧烈震荡,美国政府不得不紧急出台B计划。一年前,危机伊始,美国政府就曾试图稳定金融体系。贝尔斯登倒闭时,美国
政府劝说摩根大通购买它,并以美联储提供300亿美元接管部分不良资产作为激励。“两房”财务出现危机,美国政府接管了它们。到了雷曼兄弟和美林,美国政
府劝说它们开展自救。但是,为寻找最有利于自己的交易(通常是能让老板升职的交易),这两家投行花了很长时间。看出它们自救缓慢的原因,美国政府决定“杀
鸡给猴看”,让雷曼兄弟倒闭。但它没有让AIG步雷曼兄弟后尘,接管了这家保险巨头。因为AIG就是那只“猴子”。 但是,雷曼兄弟破产让已经脆弱的金融市场更加恐慌。养老基金等机构投资者重新思考这个问题:它们该和谁做生意。华尔街坍塌的谣言四起,使机构投资者已
经准备从华尔街撤出。一旦机构投资者撤出,华尔街的金融机构将会大批关门。这也是为什么雷曼兄弟倒闭后,卖空者大量抛出高盛和摩根士丹利的股票。两大投行
股票顿时疯狂下跌,感觉就像华尔街的末日来临。如果政府那时不采取措施,美国金融体系可能真的崩溃。 有一点很讽刺。华尔街孕育了对冲基金(卖空方),这次却差点被它害死。2001年科技泡沫破灭后,对冲基金开始活跃。它们的成长很快,现在已经管理2
万亿美元资产,而且大到可以与华尔街较量。这像是现代版《俄狄浦斯王》(Oedipus
play)。对冲基金杀害了它们的双亲,占领了它们的王国。虽然政府的措施暂时拖住它们,但是,离悲剧结束尚早。 有的学究和政府官员们,对保尔森和伯南克处理危机的方式赞不绝口。我不太同意。因为他们没有理解这场危机的根源。这场危机标志着“格林斯潘债务王国”
倒塌。华尔街贵族们通过将债务反复打包——它们被称做衍生品,每年获得数十亿美元收入。但是,政府不可能维持住这个大泡沫。危机过后,金融体系应会焕然一
新。政府应该查封所有破产的金融机构,清理股东和债权人,迅速降低杠杆率,吸引国外投资,重建规模更小但生机盎然的金融体系。相反,美国政府却指望制造泡
沫的人来解决问题。 大多数华尔街大腕们已经被开除了,但是拿着上百万美元的解雇金。可能的话,他们终有一天会受到惩罚。幸存的人,仍然不相信他们的成功是一个幻影,还继
续维护着他们的王国。在泡沫中,只需要胆子大,就可以成功,而不需要聪明才智。但是,成功却让他们相信自己都是聪明人。这也是为什么他们结局如此悲惨——
连他们都不能理解自己创造的金融工具。所以,政府援救这些人的努力一直没有收到效果。 美国政府采用拖延战术,是考虑到正在进行的总统大选。美国政府援救市场的行为,暴露出过去它们在经济政策上的决策失误。这会降低共和党候选人麦凯恩
11月当上总统的可能。现在的市场形势,逼迫美国政府不得不采取行动。布什政府的援救行动,很可能让麦凯恩错失当选总统的机遇。 B计划难担重任 B计划如何实现呢?我认为它只会暂时提振市场信心。投资者幻想政府接管不良资产,麻烦已经过去,“正常生活”将重新开始。这种天真的想法很快就会破
灭。谁来为这些损失埋单?政府会追究股东和债权人的责任吗?那些房屋贬值的纳税人能有钱来偿付这些损失吗?已经负债10万亿美元的政府,还能借更多的钱来
支付这个大账单吗? 即便为不良资产的损失埋了单,美国经济的杠杆率仍然很高。重组美国经济需要大笔资金。2007年,美国的非金融部门债务占GDP的226%。十年前,
这一数字还仅为183%。同期,金融部门债务从占GDP64%的水平上升到114%。因此,泡沫破灭后,真实经济可能需要开展股权融资,所需资金约为
5.5万亿美元,相当于美国股市市值的三分之一。即便美国人可以勒紧腰带,提高储蓄率,来使股市繁荣,这个过程也太漫长,难让市场情绪平稳。美国可能需要
借助外国资本,约占所需资金的一半。 美国金融部门可能必须减少5万亿美元到8万亿美元债务,来降低杠杆率。美国的不良资产也差不多有几万亿美元。其中,已经报告的损失超过了4000亿美
元。新的损失甚至远超过这个水平。危机开始前,总体损失已经接近美国金融体系的资本,因此,美国可能必须让债权人——以外国央行为主——成为它几大金融机
构的主要所有者。去年一轮集资浪潮,美国金融机构只将少数的股权卖给其他国家的主权财富基金。它们对这些金融机构没有任何控制权,当然对遭受的损失很愤
慨。未来的融资模式里,美国的金融机构可能必须卖给外国人大量股权,使它们可以有更大的控制权。 解决美国危机,必须由那些外汇储备高达10万亿美元的国家参与——美国经济资本不充裕。一个折中解决方案,可能是用一种形式的债务替代现在的债务。B
计划就是这种方式。当骗局无法继续下去...
|
-
|
拯救美国要靠外援( 查看原文 ) 谢国忠 [09-24 11:39] 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ 没有来自全球各界的迅速行动,美国金融系统将彻底崩溃 禁止卖空交易、成立政府机构收购不良资产、为货币市场基金(Money Market Funds)提供紧急担保……美国政府的这些行动总算为金融市场带来了一线生机,然而,这可能只是昙花一现。 美国仍亟需大量资金,以弥补政府处理不良资产过程中的损失,降低实体经济与金融部门的杠杆率,并寻求贷款拉动以外的增长方式。前路必将漫长而艰难,也许只有通过全球合作才能寻找到出路。 穷途急寻外援 来自市场的压力,迫使美国政府不得不采取一些新办法来控制局面。本次危机祸起过高的杠
杆率,这一现象尤其流行于华尔街经纪人的业务中。卖空者已经有意识地降低杠杆。他们减少了份额,造成市场恐慌,促使他们的交易伙伴撤离,继而导致的流动性
损失使那些高度杠杆化的经纪人失血而死。显然,对卖空交易下达禁令,就可以让他们活得久一点。具有讽刺意味的是,高科技泡沫破裂之后,华尔街放行卖空交易
与对冲基金业的初衷,正是为了经济再度活跃;而现在,它们却重蹈了俄狄浦斯的悲剧——回到家中杀死了父母,占有了他们的房屋。 然而,技术层面
的改动并不能改善经济基本面的糟糕状况。单纯依赖杠杆增加的商业不再可行,不可避免的去杠杆化或许会导致一场撕心裂肺的衰退。由于美国经济不敢投资的现
状,当通常采取的国内各种债务之间的辗转腾挪已再无回旋余地时,印发货币变成惟一的出路。最终,这将致使美元的崩溃,引发恶性通货膨胀。 既然美国的每个部门都存在过度杠杆化的现象,那么,它们能从何处寻找资金,用来调整经济中的资本结构呢? 美国要应对危机,惟有联合起那些拥有10万亿美元的外汇储备的国家。全世界都应为防止不幸后果的发生而走到一起,尤其是中国、日本、科威特、沙特阿拉伯
和阿联酋这些持有大量外汇储备的国家,应与美国政府坐下来,一道商讨如何对美国经济重新注入资本,将其持有的国债等债券类的美元资产,转换为股票等证券类
资产。 确保美国这场危机能够被顺利有序地解决,对于全世界而言,都有着十分现实的利益。如果美国不得不通过发行货币的方法来应对危机中的问题,其他国家持有的美元资产将遭受重大损失,并导致全球范围内不可预测的衰退。 美国不断升高的杠杆率引导着过去十年间全球经济需求增长。其传统贸易伙伴的高额外汇储备、美国经济中过多的杠杆,正是一枚硬币的两面。现在看来,这两方面都需要纳入美国解决危机的办法之中。 此番“债转股”所需的资金规模是巨大的。一方面,美国非金融部门的债务已经从十年前国内生产总值(GDP)的183%,扩张到去年GDP的226%。同
时,金融部门的债务在同期也从GDP的64%激增到114%。因此,实体经济可能需要相当于GDP再增长40%、也即55000亿美元的资金,这一数额等
于美国股市资本总额的三分之一。而其中至少一半的需求应该诉诸外国资本的注入。 金融部门资本需求的规模,取决于其去杠杆化
(deleverage)的程度。实际需要的去杠杆规模可达5万亿美元到8万亿美元。其中,很大一部分是不良资产。由于目前的总损失可能与危机爆发前美国
金融系统中的总资本数额相当,让外国投资者成为美国大型金融机构的主要拥有者,也许是必然的选择。过去一年中,美国金融机构向全世界的国家主权基金卖出了
少量股份。由于其他国家对这些机构毫无控制力,它们当然对其遭受的严重损失愤慨不已。而在今后募集资金的过程中,美国的金融机构也许不得不向外资出售股份
令其实现控股。 排外心理作祟 美国需要改变其针对外来投资的政策。其对来自西方世界以外国家的投资抱有排外心理,这
是寻求全球解决方案的最主要障碍。然而,鉴于美国现在仍然自视甚高,其国内政策具有明显的狭隘、排外色彩,这项对于世界各国都是双赢的建议,被实施的可能
性却非常小。即使美国是世界上最大的债务国,其行为却好像最大债权国一般。也许,美国人还要吃更多的苦头才能转变态度。 而随着美国政府设立新机构接管不良资产的行动,下一步将是债务从私人部门向公共部门的转移。理论上,出售不良资产将使流动性有所放松;但是买家是谁?谁又该为损失负责?在美国,大家各自的债务都已经够多的了,只有外国人可以为最终的“债转股”提供所需的股本。 然而,美国并不情愿接受来自非西方国家的资本,这样一来,也只有印发货币了。美联储为弥补处理不良资产过程中的损失,可以收购联邦政府发行的任何债券,必将导致通胀高企。而一旦外国投资者也开始抛售其美元资产,美国终将在这种内外夹击之下发生恶性通胀与经济混乱。 对于外国政府而言,为保自身免于如此窘状,将持有的美元国债变为股票,是在通胀期间保值的明智做法。美国股票的估价合理公正。它们也许会在近几个月中下跌,但其价值现在远优于美国国债。各国的中央银行都应把如何保存财富作为首要的考量。 有趣的是,若其他各国如此行事,美国经济中的“证券—资本”短缺也将得以缓解,并推高债券收益率,进而使美联储减少货币发行量。 如此一来,也许拯救美国,还要看外国人的。■ 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/
|
-
|
Saving America/ 谢国忠 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ The U.S. financial system could go under without swift action from the global community. By Andy Xie, board member of Rosetta Stone Advisors Limited Banning short
selling, establishing a government entity for warehousing bad assets,
and guaranteeing money market funds have brought relief to financial
markets. But this may be temporary. The U.S. still needs to find money
to pay the losses from disposing of bad assets, decreasing leverage in
the real economy and financial sector, and finding a non-debt-driven
method to make the economy grow. The road ahead will be long and hard.
The global community may have to work together for a solution. Market pressure
has forced the U.S. government to adopt the barrage of new measures.
The origin of the crisis is excessive leverage, especially at Wall
Street brokerages. Short sellers have learned to bring them down. They
short their shares to create a panic that sends their trading
counterparts fleeing. The resulting loss of liquidity bleeds the highly
leveraged brokers to death. Obviously, banning short selling allows
them to live longer. Ironically, Wall Street created the short sellers
or hedge fund industry after the hi-tech bubble burst to juice up its
businesses. Like a modern day Oedipus tragedy, they have come home to
slay their parents and take their homes. However,
technical changes don't alter the fundamentals. Businesses that live
solely on increasing leverage are no longer viable. Deleveraging is
inevitable, which could lead to a gut-wrenching recession. Every sector
in America is overleveraged. Where can they find the money to
recapitalise the economy? The solution to
America's crisis must involve the countries that own US$ 10 trillion in
foreign exchange reserves. The U.S. economy is undercapitalised. An
internal solution is usually one form of debt replaced with another.
The current proposals fall into this category. When the shell game runs
out of options, printing money is the only way out. That will
eventually lead to the U.S. dollar collapsing and hyperinflation in the
U.S. economy. The world
should come together to prevent such a tragic ending. Countries with
big foreign exchange reserves like China, Japan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates, for example, should sit down with the
U.S. government to find a way to recapitalise its economy. They should
swap their U.S. dollar assets in debt instruments like treasuries for...
|
-
|
谢国忠:全球“硬着陆”( 点击查看原文 ) 谢国忠/文 [09-23 14:02] 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ 亚洲的1997(金融危机)就是美国的2008;亚洲的1998就是美国的2009 【《财经网》专稿/特约经济学家 谢国忠】 美国政府正在组建类似于重组信托公司(Resolution
Trust
Corporation,RTC)的国有资产管理公司,收购金融机构的不良资产并暂时储存起来,以备今后处置。这是向正确方向迈出的一步。在笔者看来,市
场可能感觉良好,在一两周内出现短暂反弹。而随之而来的援救细节就会使投资者感到不安。政府可能会以非常低廉的价格收购不良资产。许多金融机构在被迫减计
后仍然无法生存。接下来,政府可能会试图接管这些机构,正如其对AIG所做的一样,如此便会造成现有投资者所持股票收益的大幅冲减。现在正是反弹出货的良
机。 除此之外,市场就没有任何利好消息值得滞留了。金融危机还远未到结束之时,而经济危机已经接踵而至,美国正走向“硬着陆”。美国的消费中
很大一部分是由信贷泡沫支撑,而随着泡沫的破裂,消费信贷立即干涸,美国经济很可能将会出现2%-5%的负增长。亚洲的1997(金融危机)就是美国的
2008;亚洲的1998就是美国的2009。 而欧洲与日本经济已经在收缩。他们的衰退过程很可能延续到2009年。两地区国内需求乏力,且
皆为出口导向型经济。它们经济的走弱也将会反作用于美国经济。虽然美国曾在2008年上半年出口强劲增长,但由于信贷危机对消费者的打击,来自出口方面的
支持骤然消失。下行螺旋才刚刚开始。 中国的“硬着陆”风险正在迅速上升。占到GDP名义价值的40%,以及GDP增值大约25%的出口,在
2009年可能出现30年来首度下降。中国出口一度依靠其规模小﹑商品廉价的优势,不过全球需求如何,都能通过扩大市场份额而获得稳步增长;而现在,中国
成为世界上最大的出口国,市场份额的增加再也不能抵消经济进入下行趋势的压力了。 中国的资产泡沫正在破裂。催生泡沫的动力就是出口产业的创收与“热钱”流入。而这两大来源都在萎缩。房地产市场可能面临着“硬着陆”,若发生崩溃,将对工业产生巨大影响。对汽车与大型家电的需求不会有显著增长,其中许多甚至会下降。 零售业前景还算乐观。由于劳动力市场内的供需更为平衡,工资的增长速度良好。但是,中国的消费只占GDP的40%。即便其发生10%的增长,对GDP增
长的贡献也仅为4个百分点。而事实上,说消费达到10%的增长还算乐观的。因为来自出口放缓和房地产市场收缩的收入效应,对家庭收入会产生显著影响。 我相信,政府将推出一个财政刺激计划。中共十七届三中全会将在下个月举行。届时可能就此刺激计划的必要性达成共识。而其内容则不可预测。我希望这一计划
将包括解决地方政府的流动性问题,提高食品价格以实现农民增收的问题,以及加速基础建设问题。这一刺激计划对经济增长率的提高,不大可能超过2个百分点;
它只能作为一种经济下行的缓冲措施,而非保持高增长率的利器。 无论我们从生产、需求或收入的哪个角度来看,中国明年的增长率可能会显著低于2008年。在1998年时,电力消费量连续两个季度收缩。如果明年发生相同的情况,我也不会感到惊奇。 随着欧洲与日本经济的紧缩,美国正走向“硬着陆”。而中国也可能发生“硬着陆”,资本市场在可预见的未来几乎不会有所表现。如果全球经济在2010年前后稍有复苏,资本市场可能在2009年年中才会有所表现。 基于目前的形势,我对能源与黄金仍然看好。富人们的“卡特尔”发挥了作用,也就是现在的欧佩克(OPEC)。它在20世纪90年代未能发挥作用,是因为
那时其成员国还不够富有,并且每个成员都在通过欺骗获取利益;而现在,在价格下跌的时候,它们当然没有扩大生产的动机,它们甚至连手头所挣的钱都花不完,
也不需要去挣更多。 而黄金交易在宽松的货币政策下成为一场赌博。世界所有主要经济体的真实利率都是负的,2009年的情况只会更糟。而黄金作为一种通货的替代品,当货币供给像现在一样激增时,黄金价格也应该上涨。 我们生活在一个有趣的时代。这是格林斯潘泡沫的终结。在过去20年中,由于格林斯潘创造的流动性使得华尔街与实体经济紧密相连,金融主导了全球经济。而
那不过是批着衍生品外衣的债务泡沫。放眼未来,局势将会十分艰难。1989年,社会主义声誉扫地,2008年,金融资本主义也灰头土脸。我们还不知道未来
的世界会如何变化,但必将大为不同。■ 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/
|
-
|
Global Hard Landing/ 谢国忠 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ The US government is setting up an
RTC-like organization to purchase bad assets from financial
institutions for warehousing and disposing overtime. This is a step in
the right direction. Market may feel good for a couple of weeks, which
is how long this bounce would last, in my view. Details of the rescue
may unsettle investors. The government may purchase the bad assets at
very low prices. Many financial institutions still wouldn't be viable
after the forced write-downs. The government may seek deals with them
like with AIG, which would be hugely dilutive for existing investors.
This is a bounce to sell into. Apart from the
short-lived bounce, there is little upside to stay in the market. While
the financial crisis is far from over, the economic crisis is already
around the corner. The US is heading for a hard landing. A significant
part of the US consumption is kept afloat by the credit bubble. As the
bubble collapses, the credit for consumption dries up, the US's economy
will likely contract by 2-5%. 1997 for Asia is 2008 for America, 1998
for Asia 2009 for America. Europe and Japan are
already contracting. Their recession will likely last through 2009.
They have little domestic demand strength and have always been
export-driven. Their weakness will feed back into the US. It has
benefited from strong exports in 1H08. The export support vanishes just
as its credit crisis hits its consumers. The downward spiral is just
beginning. The risk for a hard landing in China is
rising and fast. China's exports, 40% of GDP in nominal value and
probably 25% of GDP in value added, may decline in 2009 for the first
time in three decades. China was small enough and cheap enough to grow
its exports regardless of global demand through market share gains.
But, China is now the largest exporter in the world. Market share gain
couldn't offset downward trend anymore. China's
property bubble is bursting. The fuel for the bubble was the export
income and hot money inflow. Both sources are contracting. The property
market is probably heading for a hard landing. The property burst will
have a large effect on industry. Demand for auto and white goods won't
grow much, may even decline. Retail sales would do ok.
Wages are rising at good speed due to better balance between demand and
supply in labor market. But, China's consumption is only 40% of GDP.
Even if it grows 10%, it contributes four...
|
-
|
Obama or McCain: The dollar will weaken 点击查看译文 / 謝國忠 The US is muddling through in its handling of the crisis. That makes
the election outcome potentially very important. 15 years ago, Japan
cut interest rate to zero to stabilze bankrupt financial institutions
and boost fiscal stimulus to stabilize demand. That led to a 'lost'
decade, which allowed businesses and banks to slowly recover their
viability. It was actually slow transfer of government money to
corporate balance sheet. The equilibrium, however, was made possible by
the big trade surplus, i.e., high savings rate, which kept interest
rate low depiste high fiscal deficit and yen strong despite zero
interes rate. The US runs 5% of GDP in current account.
The government debt level is already too high. Japanese solution is not
viable. The only remaining weapon is the dollar. The US can print
dollar and share the burden with the world. I think the new
administration will use it aggressively. The equilibrium for the US
over the next few years is likely negative real interest rate, high
inflation, and weak dollar. What upsets the equilibrium is a potential
bond market collapse. So, as long as the treasury yield remains low,
the US has no incentive to keep dollar strong. Only when central banks
dump treasuries that the US would change its policy. -------------------------------------------------------- The
US presidential election is entering its final weeks. Both Democrats
and Republicans had their conventions and crowned their candidates.
Some analysts call the election the most important since 1980. The
comparison is certainly apt. The US was facing a foreign policy crisis
as Iranian Revolutionary Guards held the US embassy staff hostages and
surging oil price caused stagflation. But, today's problems are more
intractable. Today's symptoms of stagflation and foreign policy crisis
reflect deeper structural problems. The costs of healthcare and social
security are the bombs that may explode the US economy. The US
property-***-credit bubble results from the desire to maintain living
standard higher than what fundamentals could support. The bursting of
the bubble should make the US face reality. But, it is not. The
response, so far, is denial. Then current administration is using the
central bank to lend to failing financial institutions to keep them
alive. Unless political changes lead to a different approach, the US
will likely stagnate like Japan before and with inflation. The
takeover of...
|
-
|
在雷曼兄弟的事情上,美国政府正试图划出救助的底线。如果它坚持现在的新立场,这将标志着一场金融风暴的开始。因为没有进行去杠杆化,这场持续一年的危机正在变成慢动作。金融部门的负债已经从2007年第二季度的14.8万亿美元上升到了2008年第一季度的15.9万亿美元。 正常的金融危机意味着金融体系的去杠杆化。如果去杠杆化真在美国发生,我们必须面对三个问题:为雷曼兄弟解困而产生的流动性问题、风险资产的重新定价以及严峻的经济低迷局势。 这场市场风暴实际上是为了解决雷曼兄弟6000亿美元资产所导致的流动性担忧以及AIG可能面临的上述困境。笔者认为,这种资产拯救不会挫伤任何人。美联储已经拓展了他的最后贷款人职责,以至于很难看出流动性问题会像一个世纪前那样导致整个经济系统的下滑。但令人担心的因素仍然存在。 资产的重新定价会冲销掉几个金融机构的偿付能力。如果雷曼兄弟卖掉它的CDO部分和其他有问题的资产,这个价格就会是市场价格了,当然有可能接近于零。这将迫使其他机构按市值定价。有多少机构会因此倒下呢?我们不知道。此外,70万亿美元的CDS也需要重新定价。 资产重新定价还可能对经济产生大的影响。廉价的信用已经助长了美国的消费。信用之所以廉价,是因为美联储和华尔街轻易创造了那些低估了风险同时又让人很难懂的产品。资产重新定价意味着美国家庭的信用将大幅度减少。美国经济可能会面临10多年前在亚洲发生的一切:GDP衰退 4%~5%。 我相信,整个美国金融体系也许已经是负资产。如果杠杆资产贬值10%,也许就没有任何资产了。美国金融体系过度杠杆化,以至于难以承受大幅的资产价格贬值。10年前,美国金融产业的杠杆化是GDP的70%,5年前是100%,2007年则是137%。我们可以争论杠杆化的比例是否应该回到100%或者70%,这个数字也许在两者之间。因此,去杠杆化的规模应该超过6万亿美元,这相当于雷曼兄弟受困资产的10倍。那么多的去杠杆化意味着资产价格将出现大的缩减。但是,美国金融体系杠杆化太多了,以至于很难承受。这也许意味着整个金融体系已经破产。 现在有两种方法对付这场危机。正确的路径是让市场出清,为不良资产建立一个可流动市场。市场和经济都会很快见底。十年前亚洲就是这样做的。另外的选择是,把不良资产隐藏起来,然后允许金融机构在利润和损失抵消之间慢慢恢复。目前来看,美国正在像日本15年前做的那样,选择的是第二种路径。不同的是,美国由于贸易逆差或者低储蓄率,现在是通货膨胀,而日本当时是通货紧缩。 让雷曼兄弟倒闭似乎表明美国政府正寻求一个市场化的解决方案。我并不十分确信这一点。去杠杆化的比例太大,以至于市场难以消化。美国政府也许会重新回到援助行动的循环中来。他们会让AIG倒掉吗?如果他们救助了AIG,那我们就又重新回到了老样子。 美国唯一的解决办法是印钱来掩盖金融机构的流动性问题,让他们加班来清理损失。而市场为此将卖掉美元,买进黄金。 美国正在这场危机的处理中蹒跚而行。这使得这种选择非常重要。15年前,日本将利率降到了零,来稳定破产的金融机构,然后用财政资金来稳定需求。这导致了“失去的十年”,企业和银行在此期间慢慢恢复生存能力。这实际上是一个把政府的钱转移到公司资产平衡表上的缓慢过程。这种平衡只有在高额的贸易顺差、高储蓄率等基础上才有可能。 美国的经常账户占GDP的5%。政府负债水平已经很高。因此日本的解决方案并不可行。唯一剩下的武器就是美元了。美国可以印刷美元,然后让世界共同来分担。接下来几年,美国可能面临的是负的真实利率、高通胀、弱美元。债券市场的潜在崩溃可能摧毁这个平衡。所以,只要美国国债收益率保持低水平,美国就没有动力让美元强势。只有等各国中央银行抛售美国国债时,美国才可能改变它的政策。 (翻译:丛玫,原刊第一财经日报)
|
-
|
Normal 0 7.8 磅 0 2 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso- style- name:普通表格; mso- tstyle- rowband- size:0; mso- tstyle- colband- size:0; mso- style- noshow:yes; mso- style- parent:""; mso- padding- alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso- para- margin:0cm; mso- para- margin- bottom:.0001pt; mso- pagination:widow- orphan; font- size:10.0pt; font- family:"Times New Roman"; mso- fareast- font- family:"Times New Roman"; mso- ansi- language:#0400; mso- fareast- language:#0400; mso- bidi- language:#0400;} 谢国忠:前路多舛 《环球企业家》2008年9月5号刊 谢国忠搜狐证券博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ 即便全球经济从当前的危机中恢复,因巨额债务而繁荣的金融体系仍将步履维艰 如果你希望通胀会很快消失,那我不得不告诉你一个坏消息:长达二十年的通货紧缩已经结束了;接下来等待我们的是十年通货膨胀的熊熊烈焰。在通缩时代,政府、企业和家庭通过积极负债来刺激经济,而现在它们必须尽快处理自己的负债,否则后果不堪设想。 恰恰是全球化带来了上一轮的通缩期。柏林墙的倒塌标志着社会主义经济阵营的瓦解,这导致了总需求的下降从而使能源价格维持在低位。这些国家实行的出口拉动型经济战略使得制造业的产品价格在二十年的时间里持续下滑。这些力量促使全球范围内的通胀率下降。 经过数年出口增长,这些前社会主义国家得以重建自己的经济体。通胀率的上升首先表现在大宗商品市场,例如原油和粮食。 中央银行们并没有试图抚平通胀,反而印刷更多的纸币来挽救摇摇欲坠的金融机构。在二十年成功控制通货膨胀之后,他们没有做好心理准备接受一场能够让通货膨胀停下来的大衰退。相反,他们正寻找各种理由证明增发纸币的正确性。 更糟糕的是,全球化大潮使通货膨胀也成为全球化问题,并更难驾驭。实际上,由于劳动力和自然资源要在全球范围内实现供需平衡,因而它们的价格反应出全球货币总量的增长。任何一个试图通过收紧货币供应来减少需求的国家都因此而影响了国内经济增长。相反,某个经济体对于通胀的抑制效果却被分摊到每一个国家。这种明显不公平的激励机制,使得积极应对通胀困难重重。这也是为什么世界上绝大多数国家、包括美国都宣称自己的通货膨胀是“输入型”的。但如果将全球经济作为一个整体来看,它又去哪里获得这些“输入”呢? 另一个导致政府不作为的借口是:通胀只存在于孤立的几个领域,例如原油、或者食品价格。但货币总是流向任何一个能够上涨的领域。在一个通胀周期的第一阶段,食品和能源价格会首先上涨,接下来价格的上涨带来投机,加速从纸币印刷到通货膨胀的转变过程。在第二阶段,制造业和服务业的价格上涨。最后,工人们会因为生活标准下降而要求工资上涨。 大多数分析人士认为最后一幕不会到来,因为工会组织已经不如以往强大了。但是,组织的力量常常因为需求而非供给驱动。当经济飞速增长,通货膨胀压力很小,劳动者并不需要组织。当通胀降低他们的生活水平,他们能够快速组织起来,对雇主施加加薪的压力。 为防止经济滑入恶性通胀的深渊,全世界需要共同合作,实施紧缩策略并一同度过阵痛。而美国对于拯救自己金融体系的强烈需求,使得这种合作变得不可能。 事实上,美国的金融体系有可能会整体破产。美国借了 15 万亿美元的外债来运行金融市场。如果这些资产贬值 10% ,美国金融系统长期以来建立起来的公正和优越感将彻底崩溃。对于美国政府而言,解决这个问题的正确办法是将处境艰难的金融机构国有化,重组或者破产清算,然后重新私有化。这也正是 10 年前,亚洲国家面对金融危机的做法。 美国却依然希望通过轻松的方式来维护美元在世界经济体中的地位,当外国投资者希望收回借款时,美联储就推出更多的印钞机。美国的宽松货币政策直接限制了其他国家的紧缩程度。随着美元供给的增加,商品价格会继续上升。其他经济体可以通过缩减需求来控制价格,但这恰恰给了美国更多发行货币的空间:其他国家也就没有了足够的动力来实施紧缩。 在即将到来的通胀时期,我们必须要做一些策略上的调整来保证生存。首先是缩减债务。在通缩时,顺畅的流动性使得以债偿债变得容易。但是通胀将迫使央行上调利率,这种环境下,借新债还旧债的难度会进一步加大,而且滞胀会打压资产价格,此时再通过负债策略来持有资产可不是一个好主意。 第二,尽管贵金属价格近期大跌,但它仍是最好的保值手段。通常在牛市中,深度下跌正是最好的买入时机:低买高卖。但如果你被所谓的专家意见所误导,高价买入低价卖出,那就忍住先别着急卖,等这个深跌结束。 第三,和贵金属一样,大宗商品、尤其是能源市场仍然牛气冲天、当然现在的下调幅度也远远超过贵金属,不适合有心脏病的投资者。但投资者可以选择那些从大宗商品繁荣中获益的公司,例如石油服务公司,与石油价格大幅波动不同,前者有更加稳定上升的收益。 谢国忠搜狐证券博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ (作者为独立经济学家)
|
-
|
Choice cuts / 謝國忠 谢国忠搜狐证券博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ This article is for South China Morning Post As growth slows, Beijing must boost efficiency rather than support falling stock and property prices Updated on Sep 05, 2008 China's
economy is facing unprecedented challenges. An asset bubble bursting at
home and contracting global demand abroad are working together to slow
economic growth. Exports and property have directly contributed to half
the growth in this cycle. These sectors will probably stagnate or even
contract over the next 12 months. Obviously the slowdown will be
significant. Many businesses, local governments and
pundits are advocating ditching macro tightening (that is, lending more
money) and intervening directly to prop up property and stock prices,
or bail out distressed businesses. But this won't work and would be
destabilising. Despite a 60 per cent decline from the peak, China's
stocks are not undervalued. The problem with property is that prices
are too high for buyers. The solution is lower prices. Macro
tightening, despite the rhetoric, hasn't been that strong. According to
the central bank, lending by financial institutions increased by 3.1
trillion yuan (HK$3.5 trillion) in the first seven months of this year,
up from 2.9 trillion yuan last year. The nominal gross domestic product
expanded by 20 per cent in the first half of 2008 from last year's
figure and, hence, all else being equal, the debt appetite should be 20
per cent higher. Further, companies raised 640
billion yuan last year, or 53.4 billion a month, on Hong Kong and
Shanghai markets, compared with 16.8 billion yuan a month so far this
year. Adjusting for the economic base effect and stock market conditions, incremental funding is 13 per cent tighter this year. Is
this reduction too much? The GDP deflator - the broadest inflation
gauge - rose 9.6 per cent, and the consumer price index by 7.1 per cent
in the first half of this year. Even by the loosest standards, China is
experiencing broad-based inflation. From labour and food to energy,
inflationary pressure remains intense. Unless financial conditions
tighten, China could experience runaway inflation. So, a 13 per cent
cut in incremental funding may not be sufficient to reverse the
inflationary tide. The 15.5 per cent credit growth rate in the first
seven months of the year, though slower than in previous years, is
still higher than the long-term growth target for nominal GDP. If the
long-term...
|
-
|
Back to Earth( 点击查看译文 )/ 谢国忠 谢国忠搜狐证券博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ 相关报道: 广石化原副厂长梁柏年受贿案开庭 | 广石化原副厂长梁柏年受贿案开庭 | 广石化原副厂长梁柏年受贿案开庭 --> With the Olympics over, it's time for China to face some
unprecedented challenges including lower foreign demand, rising costs
at home, and liquidity. By Andy Xie, board member of Rosetta Stone Advisors Limited With the Olympics over, it is
time for China to face some unprecedented challenges including lower
foreign demand, rising costs at home, and liquidity. No other country has spent even close to the money China has on the
Olympics. But with the largest domestic gold haul in the nation’s
history, Michael Phelps and Usain Bolt, all that money seems worth it. That China could spend that kind of money on the Games is due to its
economic successes in the past three decades. Of course, Deng
Xiaoping’s ‘Reform and Opening Up’ policy led the country down the path
of success. That policy should have received the shiniest gold medal at
the games. The Olympic Party is over. We must come back to real world again, which
can be unpleasant. China’s economy is facing unprecedented challenges,
though most have nothing to do with the Olympics. First, for the first
time in three decades, the economies of Europe, Japan, and the U.S. may
be contracting simultaneously. It is putting severe downward pressure
on China’s exports. Second, China’s own assets bubbles, fueled by hot
money (partly due to optimism related to the Olympics), have burst.
Many businesses and local governments have over-expanded on
bubble-related revenues or borrowings. They are facing a liquidity
crunch as asset prices decline. Third and more fundamentally, rising
production costs are casting doubts on China’s low-cost expansion
strategy. There are right ways and wrong ways to cope with the challenges. The
wrong ways are to deal with symptoms of falling asset prices and the
rising CPI with price-targeting administrative measures. Such policies
may ease the pain in the short term but could lead to a general
economic crisis later. The right way is to combine short-term demand
stabilization policies with efficiency-improving reforms. China could
and should (1) increase the share of fiscal revenue allotted to local
governments to ease their liquidity problem, (2) accelerate
infrastructure projects to cushion the economic deceleration, and (3)
reform the financial sector to improve economic efficiency. China’s per capita...
|
-
|
Not time for bottom fishing (查看译文) 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ One year ago, Jim Cramer, a stock promoter on CNBC, screamed like a
crybaby on TV for the Fed to save the Wall Street. It was probably the
starting point for the crisis. Soon the European Central Bank injected EUR95bn into the eurozone banking system to resuscitate the interbank
market. One year on, the crisis continues with no end in sight. Losses
at prominent financial institutions are still piling up, having
reported $450 billion of losses. Their survival is often in doubt. The
economies, however, have done better than I expected. The fiscal
stimulus in the US prevented a technical recession. Europe and Japan
also avoided a technical recession in the first half. Inflation,
however, has picked up more than I expected. The core CPI in the US
surpassed 5%, eurozone 4%, and Japan 3%. Emerging economies are
experiencing double-digit inflation on average. The global inflation is
probably around 5.5% now, the highest in a quarter century. The
growth and inflation surprises are related. Central banks around the
world have put growth ahead of inflation. Through repeated market
bailouts with liquidity injections, they have prevented financial
markets from clearing, i.e., postponing the economic impact of the
financial crisis. Hence, growth rates have surprised on the upside. On
the other hand, liquidity injections, as I predicted in August 2007,
would push up commodity prices. Oil price doubled, and rice price
trebled at their recent peaks from one year ago. Despite its recent 17%
decline, the CRB index remains 50% higher than the level in August 2007. What
happens now? First, the financial crisis due to property price decline
will continue. The losses at global financial institutions may be only
half over. The US financial institutions increased their debts by $1
trillion to $15 trillion in the past year. Deleveraging has not
happened. Without deleveraging assets remain stuck on the balance
sheets of the financial institutions. We don't know how much they are
really worth. As long as central banks continue to support the failing
financial institutions, they have no incentives to sell their assets
and recognize the losses. Hence, the financial crisis continues in slow
motion with occasional explosions to shock the market. Second,
the economic impact will become more obvious in the second half of
2008. The US and Japan may experience negative growth and Europe is
likely to slow down sharply...
|
-
|
The Crisis Returns ( 查看译文 ) The credit crisis may soon crunch harder than ever as the U.S. mortgage industry collapses. 谢国忠搜狐博客 http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/ By Andy Xie, guest economist to Caijing and a board member of Rosetta Stone Advisors Limited The worst stage of the credit
crisis may have arrived. The pillars of the U.S. mortgage industry,
the Federal National Mortgage Association, nicknamed Fannie Mae, and
the Federal Home Mortgage Corporation, nicknamed Freddie Mac, are
collapsing. They are government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and are
perceived as too big to fail, as their failures would cut off funding
for the US housing market. They own $1.5 trillion of mortgage assets
and guarantee another $3.9 trillion, covering half of the mortgages in
the U.S. The government has to bail them out. The current crisis is due to
excessive borrowing for property purchases. 'Financial innovations' in
recent years purported to decrease risks to credit investors, which
allowed less capital and more debt for property purchases. In addition
to their traditional business of buying mortgages from banks for
securitization, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought new financial
products that supported the credit derivative market. Their support
for the new financial products was the key to their viability, both due
to their size and their high credit rating as GSEs. As it turns out,
the risk reduction from financial innovations was an illusion. The
perceived reduction in risk was due to the bubble that the belief in
risk reduction caused. As these two institutions collapse, the heart
of the credit bubble is exposed. This may be the worst moment in the
ongoing crisis. The crisis won't end with the
collapse and bailout of these two institutions. More financial
institutions like regional banks may fail. For example, IndyMac Bank, a
prolific mortgage specialist that helped fuel the housing boom, was
seized July 11 by federal regulators, in the third-largest bank failure
in U.S. history. The failure may cost the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp. between US$ 4 billion and US$ 8 billion, potentially wiping out
more than 10 percent of the FDIC's US$ 53 billion deposit-insurance
fund. Indeed, the Federal government may have to recapitalize the FDIC
soon. Some estimates put the total loss from the current credit crisis
at US$ 1 trillion. The recognized losses so far, including the loss
estimates for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are half that. Even the trouble on Wall
Street...
|
更多内容 下一页 »
|
|
|